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NOTES
Nichimen America, Inc. v. United States: The Federal
Circuit Untangles the Statutory Framework for
Review of Antidumping Proceedings
I. Introduction
Dumping is defined as price discrimination between national
markets.' A foreign exporter dumps its merchandise in another mar-
ket by selling it at a lower price than it sells the same merchandise in
its home market or other foreign markets. A foreign exporter might
dump its merchandise to maximize profits when faced with an over-
supply or to gain a competitive advantage and possible achieve mo-
nopoly status in the market. 2
In the United States, concern over dumping from foreign na-
tions arose around the turn of the twentieth century. Much of the
dissatisfaction centered on German industry.3 An early attempt to
regulate dumping under the Sherman Antitrust Act of 18904 failed
when the Supreme Court declared that the Act could not reach a
sales contract entered into in a foreign country. 5 The Wilson Tariff
Act 6 suffered from the same weakness. 7 If legislation was tp succeed
in regulating dumping by foreign exporters, it needed an express
provision conferring jurisdiction over acts committed outside the
United States. 8 But Congress's next attempt, the Revenue Act of
1 JACOB VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1-3 (1923). Viner's
standard work is credited with formulating this definition. Charlene Barshefsky & Richard
0. Cunningham, The Prosecution of Antidumping Actions Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 307, 308 (1981).
2 Barshefsky & Cunningham, supra note 1, at 308. For a detailed discussion of the
types of dumping and the motives for the exporter, see VINER, supra note 1, at 110- 31.
3 VINER, supra note 1, at 51. The development of export dumping was natural in a
nation like Germany which featured large-scale machine industry, syndicated control, and
a protected domestic market. Id. at 66. For a complete discussion of German dumping in
this time period, see id. at 51-66.
4 Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988)).
5 In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909), Justice
Holmes stated for the Court: "[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the charac-
ter of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country
where the act is done." Id.
6 Ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (1894) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1988)).
7 VINER, supra note 1, at 241.
8 Id. at 240, 240 n.2 (quoting American Banana, 213 U.S. at 359) ("A conspiracy in
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1916,9 suffered from other defects. The Act prohibited the system-
atic importation or sale of dumped merchandise in the United States
with the intent to injure American industry or to restrain fair compe-
tition, and provided for criminal penalties as well as civil remedies
with treble damages.' 0 But the Act created no special duties or mon-
etary penalties collectable by Customs, nor was there capacity for any
other government agency to enforce the new law."I Enforcement
fell upon the Department ofJustice, which did not have the facilities
to enforce the criminal sanctions.12 Private parties did not have the
resources to bring the civil suits, 1 s and both parties were restricted
by the difficulty in proving "systematic" dumping, as well as preda-
tory intent. 14
Not until the Antidumping Act of 192115 did Congress succeed
in enacting legislation which could effectively combat foreign dump-
ing in the United States. The new law encompassed imports sold not
only at prices lower than in home and third nation markets, but it
also reached exports sold at less than the foreign producer's cost of
production. 16 The Tariff Act of 193017 added provisions governing
protest and judicial review'" of decisions by the Treasury Depart-
ment, then the administering authority for antidumping law. Of all
the U.S. trade law remedies against unfair foreign competition, 19 the
antidumping law as formed by these two acts ranks among the most
powerful.20
this country to do acts in another jurisdiction does not draw to itself those acts and make
them unlawful, if they are permitted by the local law").
9 Ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756.
10 VINER, supra note 1 at 243.
11 Id. at 244.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 245.
14 Id. at 244-45.
15 Ch. 14, 42 Stat. 9, repealed by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39,
§ 106(a), 93 Stat. 144, 193 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). The
antidumping provisions of the 1979 Act are substantially similar to those of the 1921 Act
which they replaced.
16 See Barshefsky & Cunningham, supra note 1, at 308-09.
17 Ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590, 734 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514, 1516a
(1988)).
18 A protest denied by Customs could be judicially reviewed in the United States Cus-
toms Court. 19 U.S.C. § 1514, amended by 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514, 1516a (Supp. III 1979). The
United States Customs Court has since been renamed the United States Court of Interna-
tional Trade. Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 601, 94 Stat. 1727, 1744
(codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
19 Other trade law remedies against unfair foreign competition include provisions
combating subsidies from foreign governments, patent and copyright infringement,
threatening "increased quantities," increased quantities causing "market disruption," and
unreasonable acts of foreign governments. See Charlene Barshefsky & Nancy B. Zucker,
Amendments to the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws Under the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988, 13 N.CJ. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 251, 251 n.2 (1988). For a detailed
outline of these trade law remedies, see Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Remedies Against "Unfair" Inter-
national Trade Practices, C536 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 551 (1990).
20 See Barshefsky & Zucker, supra note 19, at 251.
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In spite of and, perhaps, because of its strength, the antidump-
ing law is often a target for change. Following the Tokyo Round of
Multilateral Trade Agreements 21 and pursuant to lobbying influence
from U.S. business,22 Congress made significant procedural reforms
in the antidumping protest and judicial review process when it en-
acted the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.23
In Nichimen America, Inc. v. United States,24 a case of first impres-
sion, the Federal Circuit untangled the complicated statutory frame-
work governing protest and judicial review of antidumping
proceedings. This Note examines the holding of Nichimen and con-
siders the background law and the subsequent effect of Nichimen.
This Note concludes that the court correctly interpreted the statutes
and properly determined which acts of Customs are directly appeala-
ble and which must first be reviewed in an administrative hearing.
II. Statement of the Case
A. Factual Background
On March 10, 1971, the Treasury Department issued Treasury
Determination 71-76 (T.D. 71-76), an antidumping order subjecting
all televisions imported from Japan to possible assessment of an-
tidumping duties. 25 In 1971,26 the elements of an antidumping or-
der were a finding by the Secretary of the Treasury that certain
imports were being sold or were likely to be sold at less than fair
value, 27 and a finding by the United States Tariff Commission that
such sales were likely to cause injury to a United States industry. 28
21 Ruth F. Sturm, Customs: Past, Present, and Future, FED. B. NEWS &J., Apr. 1990, at
151.
22 Barshefsky & Zucker, supra note 19, at 251-52.
23 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
24 938 F.2d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
25 T.D. 71-76, 1971-1 C.B. 66.
26 The underlying determinations today are essentially the same as they were in 1971.
See statutes cited infra notes 27-28.
27 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988)). In 1971,
the sales price could be determined in either of two ways. A purchase price (PP) formula
used the price agreed to for sale prior to exportation with adjustments for costs necessary
to bring the merchandise to condition ready for shipment. 19 U.S.C. § 162 (1970) (cur-
rent version at 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b), (d) (1988)). An exporter's sales price (ESP) formula
used the price agreed to for sale in the United States with similar adjustments. 19 U.S.C.
§ 163 (1970) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c), (d) (1988)). The exporter's sales
price formula was used in limited circumstances where the exporter and the purchaser or
importer were related parties. Barshefsky & Cunningham, supra note 1, at 324 n.82.
In 1971, the fair value could be determined in any of three ways. Price in the export-
ing country was used if there was a sufficient quantity of home market sales. 19 U.S.C.
§ 164 (1970) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B) (1988)). If no such quantity
existed, but a sufficient quantity was exported to third countries, then the fair value equal-
led the price of those sales. Id. (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(l)(B) (1988)). In
the alternative, a constructed value of costs plus an ordinary profit was used. 19 U.S.C.
§ 165 (1970) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(2) (1988)).
28 The Tariff Commission "shall determine .. .whether an industry in the United
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Both findings were duly made,29 and order T.D. 71-76 imposed an-
tidumping duties collectable by Customs whenever ajapanese televi-
sion set with a sales price less than fair value was imported into the
United States. The amount of the antidumping duty would be the
difference between the sales price and the fair value,30 equal to the
difference between the United States price and the fair value, so as to
negate the importer's ability to sell the merchandise at less than its
fair value.
Between May and November of 1976, with the antidumping or-
der still in effect, 3 ' plaintiff Nichimen America, Inc. (Nichimen) im-
ported television sets from Japan into the United States.3 2 To obtain
immediate release into commerce, Nichimen posted an immediate
entry and consumption bond and agreed to pay all duties ultimately
found due.3 3
On August 30, 1985, the Department of Commerce 34 (Com-
merce) notified Nichimen that all televisions imported prior to
March 31, 1979 would be assessed an additional 3.37% ad valorema3
States is being or is likely to be injured, or is prevented from being established, by reason
of the importation of such merchandise into the United States." 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970)(current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1988)). Pursuant to the Trade Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-618, sec. 171 (a), 88 Stat. 1978, 2009, the Tariff Commission was renamed the
International Trade Commission.
29 Television Receiving Sets, Monochrome and Color, from Japan, 35 Fed. Reg.
18,549 (Dep't Treas. 1970) (determination of dumping); Television Receivers from Japan
Causing Injury, 36 Fed. Reg. 4576 (Tariff Comm'n 1971).
The Secretary of the Treasury found that, after appropriate deductions, both the pre-
import prices (PP) and, in the case of related importers, the sales prices to United States
distributors (ESP) of Japanese televisions were less than corresponding home market
prices. 35 Fed. Reg. at 18,549.
The Tariff Commission found that Japanese market share of color and monochrome
televisions in the United States increased from ten percent in 1965 to twenty-eight percent
in 1970. 36 Fed. Reg. at 4577. It also found a twenty- five percent decrease in the price of
the fiercely competitive middle range (televisions with greater than nine-inch but less than
twenty-inch diagonals). Id. The Commission unanimously concluded these injuries were
caused by Japanese imports sold at less than fair value. Id. at 4577-78.
30 19 U.S.C. § 161(a) (1970) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2) (1988)).
31 Under the Antidumping Act of 1921 and the Tariff Act of 1930, antidumping or-
ders remained in effect until a successful protest or successful review of a denied protest
contesting the underlying determinations of the Treasury Department or the International
Trade Commission. Only the assessment of antidumping duties was directly protestable;
challenge to the underlying determinations required an assessment of duties to serve as
the basis for the protest. See 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 2632 (1976). See also S.
REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 255-56 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381,
641-42. This procedure was changed in 1979. See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying
text.
32 Nichimen America, Inc v. United States, 938 F.2d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
33 Id. at 1287.
34 The Treasury Department's responsibilities as administering authority of the an-
tidumping law were reassigned to the Department of Commerce, effectiveJanuary 2, 1980.
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, § 5(a)(1)(C), (D), (H), 93 Stat. 1381, 1383 (codified at
19 U.S.C. § 2171) (1988)), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app., at 1381 (1988).
35 An ad valorem tax takes the form of a percentage of the value of what is assessed.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 51 (6th ed. 1990).
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in antidumping duties unless Nichimen requested a "section 751"
administrative review. 36 Nichimen made no such request, and on
August 15, 1986, the entries were liquidated with the additional
3.37% ad valorem in antidumping duties included in the
assessment.3
7
Nichimen paid these duties38 and filed a seven- part protest with
Customs, alleging that: (a) a 1980 agreement with the Attorney Gen-
eral and the Commerce and Treasury Departments released
Nichimen from any additional duties, (b) Customs did not follow
proper procedures in that the receivers were not before the ap-
praiser when they were appraised, (c) Customs never determined the
foreign market value or a constructed value for the receivers, (d) the
entries were not liquidated in a timely fashion as required by Cus-
toms law, (e) the dumping determination was "arbitrary, capricious
and an abuse of discretion," (f) the price of the entries was not less
than fair value, and (g) the dumping findings did not apply to
Nichimen "inasmuch as the true 'manufacturer/exporter' was
Hitachi, Ltd./Nichimen Co., Inc."3 9
B. In the Court of International Trade
In filing this protest, Nichimen relied on Title 19, section
1514(a) of the United States Code.40 Section 1514 sets forth proce-
dure and lists the orders and findings which may be protested to
Customs. 4' After Customs denied Nichimen's protest, Nichimen
filed suit in the Court of International Trade. 42 Jurisdiction for re-
view of protests denied by Customs is available in that court under
Chapter 28 of the United States Code.43 The Court of International
Trade denied the summary judgment motions of both sides and a
motion for judgment on the pleadings by Nichimen. 44 At the same
time, the court denied the government's challenge to jurisdiction,
36 Nichimen America, Inc. v. United States, 938 F.2d 1286, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Section 751 (a), 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (1982) (enacted as part of Trade Agreements Act of
1979, § 101, § 751, 93 Stat. 144, 175), governed review of Treasury Department or Com-
merce Department findings under the Antidumping Act of 1921. For a discussion of sec-
tion 751 (a), see infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
37 Nichimen, 938 F.2d at 1287.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1287-88 & n.1 (quoting Protest, 3(a)-(g)).
40 Id. at 1287.
41 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a), (c) (1982).
42 Nichimen America, Inc. v. United States, 938 F.2d 1286, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
43 "The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil
action commenced to contest the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under [ 19 U.S.C.
§ 1515]." 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982). Section 1515 pertains to review of protests to Cus-
toms under title 19, section 1514(a). 19 U.S.C. § 1515 (1982).
44 Nichimen America, Inc. v. United States, Nos. 88-128, 87-01-00047, 1988 WL
98472, at *2 (Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 22, 1988). The court found that Nichimen's protest
raised material questions of fact, making summary judgement inappropriate.
19921 535
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but granted leave to renew.45
In a later proceeding, the government renewed its challenge to
Court of International Trade jurisdiction, and on August 29, 1989,
the court granted its motion.46 The court rejected Nichimen's claim
that the antidumping law prior to the 1979 amendments governed
judicial review of its protest to Customs. 4 7 The Transitional Rules of
the 1979 Act state that:
The amendments ... shall apply with respect to the review of the
assessment of... antidumping dut[ies] on entries subject to ... [an]
antidumping finding if the assessment is made after the effective
date. If no assessment of such duty had been made before the effec-
tive date that could serve the party seeking review as the basis of a
review of the underlying determination, made by the Secretary of
the Treasury or the International Trade Commission before the ef-
fective date .... then the underlying determination shall be subject
to review in accordance with the law in effect on the day before the
effective date.48
Nichimen contended that the second sentence of this rule made its
protest judicially reviewable under the pre-amendment law. 49 The
court held that the subject matter of Nichimen's complaint was the
actual assessment and not either of the underlying determinations of
T.D. 71-76. Thus, the second sentence of this Transitional Rule
could not apply to Nichimen's complaint.5 0
The Court of International Trade next applied the 1979 an-
tidumping amendments which supplied jurisdiction over Nichimen's
protest.5 1 Jurisdiction was established only after a section 751 ad-
ministrative review was conducted before Commerce. 52 Since
Nichimen did not request section 751 review, it could not obtain ju-
risdiction in the Court of International Trade. 53
45 Id. The court stated no reason for its denial of the government's challenge to
jurisdiction.
46 Nichimen America, Inc. v. United States, 719 F. Supp. 1106, 1110 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1989).
47 id. at 1109.
48 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1002(b)(3), 93 Stat. 144, 307
(Transitional Rules).
49 Nichimen, 719 F. Supp. at 1109.
50 Id. The actual purpose of the second sentence of section 1002(b)(3) of the Trade
Agreements Act was to close a loophole which, in the case of a pre-amendment antidump-
ing order and a post- amendment assessment, would have made the underlying determina-
tions unprotestable. Id. at 1108 n.l (citing H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 182-
83 (1979)). See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
51 Nichimen America, Inc. v. United States, 719 F. Supp. 1106, 1109 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1989).
52 Id. The court stated the only avenue of appeal available for the charges of
Nichimen's complaint was through 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) as provided in 19 U.S.C. § 1516a.
Per 19 U.S.C. § 1514(b), any matter governed by section 1516a could not be judicially
reviewed if there had been no section 751 review. ichimen, 719 F. Supp. at 1109.
53 Nichimen, 719 F. Supp. at 1109.
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C. In the Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit heard Nichimen's appeal, and on July 10,
1991, affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the lower
court's ruling.54 The court held jurisdiction is a matter of law and, as
such, is reviewable de novo. 5 5 The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower
court's analysis of the applicability of the 1979 amendments, noting
that Nichimen's complaint referred only generally to the underlying
determinations of T.D. 71-76 and never specifically alleged that
either determination was erroneous. 56 Thus, Nichimen was only
contesting post-amendment assessments and could not rely on the
exception contained in the Transitional Rules. 5 7
The Federal Circuit next turned to the difficult matter of inter-
preting the antidumping review process after the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979. The court noted that the 1979 Act amended Title 19,
section 1514 to exclude antidumping decisions, as well as actions of
Customs in implementing those decisions, from the matters protest-
able to Customs. 58 Instead, review would be the responsibility of
Commerce, now the administering authority, as part of the newly
created "section 751" administrative review.5 9 The 1979 Act re-
quired an automatic annual review of the duty amount and a review
of the underlying determinations whenever new information war-
ranted subsequent analysis. 60 A 1984 amendment modified the ear-
lier law and conditioned that annual review only be conducted after a
request from an interested party. 6 '
The Federal Circuit next examined each part of Nichimen's
complaint and determined which parts were and were not covered by
section 751 administrative review. 6 2 It found parts (c) and (f), that
Customs never determined foreign or constructed market value, and
that the price of its entries was not less than fair value, to be
"squarely within the purview of section 751.1163 The court found
54 Nichimen America, Inc. v. United States, 938 F.2d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
55 Id. at 1288-89 (citing Zumerling v. Marsh, 783 F.2d 1032, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
To try a matter de novo means to try it anew, as if it had not been tried before. BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990).
56 Nichimen, 938 F.2d at 1290.
57 Id.
58 Id. The court and section 1514(b) use the word "determinations" and not "deci-
sions." Id.; 19 U.S.C. § 1514(b) (1982). It is clear from the context of the entire statute
that more than underlying determinations is intended by "determintatiois." For instance,
the amount of the duty is not an underlying determination, but is among the matters no
longer protestable to Customs. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514(a), (b), 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii), 1675(a)
(1982).
59 Nichimen America, Inc. v. United States, 938 F.2d 1286, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
60 Id. (citing the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106(a), 93 Stat.
144, 193 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1)(B), (b)(1) (1988)).
61 Id. at 1290-91 (citing the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 611,
98 Stat. 2948, 3031 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1) (1988)).
62 Id. at 1291-92.
63 Id. at 1291. Section 751 states that Commerce shall determine "the foreign market
19921
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parts (e) and (g), that the underlying determination was "arbitrary,
capricious, and an abuse of discretion" and that Nichimen was not
the true importer, not squarely within section 751, but answerable in
a section 751 review.64 Since the 1979 amendment made section
751 administrative review a prerequisite to judicial review in the
Court of International Trade, Nichimen could not obtain jurisdiction
for these four parts of its complaint without having first requested a
section 751 review. 65
The Federal Circuit did not find section 751 applicable to the
other three parts of Nichimen's complaint.66 Part (a), that Nichimen
was released by a 1980 settlement agreement, involved representa-
tives of the Department of Justice and the Treasury Department and
was not within section 751's limited scope. 67 Instead, it fell within
the general category of Title 19, section 1514(a)(1). 68 Parts (b) and
(d), that Customs did not follow its appraisal procedures and that the
merchandise did not receive a timely liquidation, fell squarely within
other subparagraphs of section 1514(a). 69 Decisions of Customs
covered by section 1514(a) are protestable directly to Customs with-
out a section 751 review; a denied protest may be appealed to the
Court of International Trade. 70 Thus Nichimen's failure to request a
section 751 review did not prejudice its right to judicial review as to
these parts of its complaint in the Court of International Trade. 7'
The Court of International Trade improperly denied jurisdiction as
to these three parts of Nichimen's complaint.
value and United States price of each entry of merchandise subject to the antidumping
duty order and included within that determination, and ... the amount, if any, by which
the foreign market value of each entry exceeds the United States price of the entry." 19
U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(A), (B) (1988).
64 Nichimen America, Inc. v. United States, 938 F.2d 1286, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
65 Id. at 1291 (citing the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39,
§ 1001(b)(3), 93 Stat. 144, 305 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1514(b) (1988)). Section 1514(b)
reads that "[wlith respect to determinations ... reviewable under section 1516a of this
title, determinations of the appropriate customs officer are final and conclusive ... unless
a civil action contesting a determination listed in section 1516a of this title is commenced
in the United States Court of International Trade." Per section 1516a, judicial review of a
section 751 administrative review is the only path for these issues to Court of International
Trade jurisdiction. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1988).
66 Nichimen, 938 F.2d at 1292.
67 Id.
68 Id. Section 1514(a)(3) includes "all charges or exactions of whatever character
within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury." 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(3) (1988).
69 Nichimen America, Inc. v. United States, 938 F.2d 1286, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Part (b) falls within subparagraph (l)-"the appraised value of merchandise"-and part
(d) falls within subparagraph (5)-"the liquidation or reliquidation of an entry." 19 U.S.C.
§ 1514(a)(1), (5) (1988).
70 Nichimen, 938 F.2d at 1292 (interpreting 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (1988)).




Congress enacted the "Judicial Review" 7 2 amendments to pro-
vide "increased opportunities for appeal of certain interlocutory and
all final determinations by the administering authority [presently
Commerce] and the International Trade Commission [ITC]." 7 3
Prior to the 1979 Act, there were several delays in the opportunity
for review which could cause hardship to affected parties. For in-
stance, a foreign producer or American importer could not challenge
affirmative determinations of the Treasury Department and the ITC
until after Customs imposed a duty on entering merchandise. 74 An
American competitor could not contest the administration of a lag-
ging antidumping investigation because such investigations could
only be challenged after they were completed. 7 5 This requirement
not only slowed the process of obtaining relief, but when the investi-
gation proceeded too slowly to combat the effects of foreign dump-
ing, it precluded relief entirely.76
To expedite relief for those adversely affected by an antidump-
ing order, Congress created Title 19, section 1516a, and amended
Title 19, section 1514, to take certain matters formerly not protest-
able until duties were assessed, and placed them within Court of In-
ternational Trade jurisdiction immediately after publication of notice
in the Federal Register. 7 7 Among the matters immediately review-
able under the new section 1516a are the decisions rendered in an-
other of the Trade Agreements Act's creations-section 751
administrative review. 78
72 Title X of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 300,
is entitled "Judicial Review."
73 S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.S.C.A.N.
381,630.
74 Id. at 245-46, reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 631; 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (1976).
75 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1976); S. REP. No. 249, at 250, reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
636.
76 S. REP. No. 249, at 250, reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 636.
77 Section 100 1(b)(3) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 93 Stat. 305, inserted
subsection (b) in section 1514 of title 19. Subsection (b) provides that "[w]ith respect to
determinations . . .reviewable under section 1516a of this title, determinations of the
appropriate customs officer are final and conclusive ... unless a civil action contesting a
determination listed in section 1516a of this title is commenced in the United States Court
of International Trade." 19 U.S.C. § 1514(b) (1988). Section 1516a provides for immedi-
ate review. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1988).
78 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(2)(B)(iii) (1988); 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1988). Section 751 review
is so entitled because the 1979 Act inserted it as section 751 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, § 751, 93 Stat. 144, 175. The
Trade Agreements Act, § 1001(a), 93 Stat. at 300-01, also provided interested American
companies with the right to judicially appeal a decision by Commerce to delay its determi-
nation. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(l)(B)(i) (1982); 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(c) (1982). See supra notes
75-76 and accompanying text. This right was later repealed because of the attendant costs
and delays. Trade and TariffAct of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 623(a)(1), 98 Stat. 2948,
3040. See H.R. REP. No. 98-725, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5122, 5174.
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As originally enacted in 1979, section 751 mandated yearly re-
view by Commerce of all antidumping determinations. 79 As
amended in 1984, the section now conditions review upon request
by an interested party.80 Section 751 review requires a hearing by
Commerce to consider the antidumping duty amount and the an-
tidumping order itself.8 ' The interested parties potentially request-
ing or attending section 751 hearings are: affected foreign producers
and exporters, their foreign governments, affected U.S. producers
and wholesalers, and affected U.S. trade and labor groups.8 2 Upon
proper determination at such a hearing, Commerce may alter the
amount of the duty or revoke the antidumping order altogether.83
The same parties with standing to appear at the hearing may contest
a section 751 decision in the Court of International Trade.8 4
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 provided timely judicial re-
view for a host of different antidumping proceedings.8 5 These op-
portunities are opened to the same interested parties who can
participate in a section 751 review.86 The number and types ofjudi-
cially reviewable determinations create a "very real potential for pro-
cedural chaos. ''8 7 What complicates section 751 review most is its
overlap with the Customs decisions protestable straight to Customs
and judicially reviewable under Title 19, section 1514(a), without a
prior section 751 review.88 This overlap is the focus of the second
aspect of the Nichimen holding.8 9
Nichimen is a case of first impression. Neither the Federal Circuit
nor the Court of International Trade previously heard a case with
facts similar to Nichimen. The two courts have decided cases involv-
79 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a), (b) (1988).
80 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98- 573, § 611, 98 Stat. 2948, 3031
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1) (1988)).
81 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1)(B), (b)(1), (c), (d) (1988); S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 17-18 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 403-04.
82 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (1988).
83 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a), (c) (1988).
84 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(d) (1988). Prior to the 1979 Act, only American producers and
wholesalers affected by an antidumping determination had standing to sue in the Interna-
tional Court of Trade before duty assessment. 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1976).
85 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1988); Barshefsky & Cunningham, supra note 1, at 361. Also
included in section 1516a are opportunities to review: failures to initiate proceedings,
Commerce determinations to suspend based on acceptance of an agreement, ITC determi-
nations on the elimination of injurious effects by an agreement, and Commerce or ITC
decisions not to review suspension agreements or previous determinations based upon
changed circumstances. Barshefsky & Cunningham, supra note 1, at 361.
86 Barshefsky & Cunningham, supra note 1, at 361. See supra text accompanying note
82.
87 Barshefsky & Cunningham, supra note 1, at 362.
88 See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (1988) (protestable to Customs); 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(2)
(B)(iii) (1988) (requiring section 751 review).




ing: the timing ofjudicial review with respect to section 751 review, 90
judicial review of ITC determinations prior to section 751 applicabil-
ity, 9 1 the right to intervene in judicial review, 92 and who qualifies as
an interested party.9 3 The closest these courts have come to either
aspect of Nichimen was in American Manufacturers of Castor Oil Producers
v. United States.9 4 Third party defendant Sanbra moved to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the court dismissed plaintiff's
complaint for failure to state a claim.9 5 None of these cases ad-
dressed the essential dispute of Nichimen: whether a party affected by
an antidumping order loses all rights to judicial review for failing to
request a section 751 review.
IV. Significance of the Case
At first glance, the holding of this case is quite confusing. The
Federal Circuit holds that Nichimen may not obtain judicial review of
its protest under the pre-1979 antidumping law because it was not
contesting the underlying determinations made by the Treasury De-
partment and the Tariff Commission, then the bodies in charge of
those determinations. 96 Then, the court holds that certain parts of
Nichimen's protest cannot be reviewed at all because they involve
antidumping determinations subject to administrative review by
Commerce as a prerequisite to judicial review. 9 7 Upon a closer look,
there are two distinct aspects of the holding, and one is of considera-
ble importance.
A. The Transitional Rules
The court holds that under the Transitional Rules, the post-
90 Cementros Guadalajara v. United States, 686 F. Supp 335, 353 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1988) (Court of International Trade jurisdiction not available until after section 751 re-
view results published), aff'd on other grounds, 879 F.2d 847 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (per curiam);
Special Commodity Group v. Baldridge, 575 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983)
(no right to judicial review while section 751 review still in progress).
91 Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v. United States, 916 F.2d
1571, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (party appealing original antidumping order to Court of Inter-
national Trade need not request a section 751 review while appeal is pending); Smith
Corona v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980) (Court of Interna-
tional Trade may review International Trade Commission's determination within one year
because section 751 review not available in first year), aff'd on other grounds, 713 F.2d 1568
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
92 Ceramica Regiomontana v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1260, 1262 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984) (interested third party participating in section 751 review may also participate in
Court of International Trade review).
93 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, No. 81-6- 00734, 1983 WL 4982, at *1 (Ct.
Int'l Trade Apr. 13, 1983) (Committee to Preserve American Color Television not an in-
terested party).
94 No. 84-4-00570, 1984 WL 6067 (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 1, 1984).
95 Id. at *4.
96 Nichimen America, Inc. v. United States, 938 F.2d 1286, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
97 Id. at 1290-91.
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1979 review procedure governs Nichimen's complaint.9 8 The 1979
Act expanded the opportunity for an American importer or a foreign
producer to object to an antidumping order. Previously, antidump-
ing law required these parties to wait until after Customs assessed
antidumping duties on entering merchandise before they could ob-
tain judicial review, regardless of whether the party objected to acts
of Customs in levying the duties or to the underlying determinations
made possibly years earlier by the administering authority and the
ITC. 99 After the 1979 amendments,' 00 an American importer or a
foreign producer can obtain administrative review of underlying de-
terminations prior to assessment of duties.' 0 '
The change in the law created one hitch. If the pre-amendment
law were to apply to antidumping orders and assessments issued or
levied before the effective date and the post-amendment law was to
govern antidumping orders and assessments after the effective date,
then certain underlying determinations would escape judicial review
altogether. 0 2 Where the underlying determinations were made
prior to the effective date, but no assessment was made until after the
effective date, the old law would exclude review because no assess-
ment was made while the old law was in effect, while the new law
would exclude review because it only applies to underlying determi-
nations made after the effective date. To close this gap, Congress
provided that such underlying determinations were judicially review-
able immediately under the terms of the old law.' 03
In finding that no part of Nichimen's complaint was judicially
reviewable under the old law, the Federal Circuit holds that the
Transitional Rules of the 1979 Act do not create jurisdiction for re-
view of antidumping duty assessments made after the effective date
and thus, is in accordance with the law as it stood prior to the effec-
tive date. If a party actually objects to an underlying determination
made before the effective date, judicial review will always be avail-
able, but no parts of a complaint which, in reality, address a post-
98 Id. at 1290.
99 See 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1976). Under section 1516 of the pre-1979 antidumping
law, only an American producer or wholesaler could appeal an antidumping determination
prior to assessment on entering merchandise.
100 The amendments were effective January 1, 1980. Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1002(a), 93 Stat. 144, 307 (Transitional Rules).
101 Under the new law, underlying determinations are immediately reviewable, in dif-
ferent forms. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. Since no section 751 review
can be held inside twelve months of the underlying duty determinations, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675(a)(1) (1988), the prerequisite of section 751 review to judicial review does not ap-
ply in the first twelve months after an antidumping order. Smith Corona v. United States,
507 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 713 F.2d 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
102 H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 189 (1979).
103 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1002(b)(3), 93 Stat. 144, 307.
S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 255 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 641.
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amendment assessment can be reviewable under the old law. The
subject of this first aspect of the holding limits its importance. Tran-
sitional Rules are just that- transitional. As time passes, their reach
and the reach of this holding will diminish.
B. Section 751 Review
The second aspect of the court's holding is far more important.
The key language added by the 1979 Act appears in section 1514 of
Title 19. Section 1514(a), which grants the Court of International
Trade jurisdiction over protests denied by Customs, begins: "Except
as provided in subsection (b) of this section . . . ;,,104 subsection (b)
reads that "[w]ith respect to determinations . . . reviewable under
section 1516a of this title, determinations of the appropriate customs
officer are final and conclusive ... unless a civil action contesting a
determination listed in section 1516a of this title is commenced in
the United States Court of International Trade."' 1 5 Judicial appeal
of section 751 reviews is listed in section 1516a. 10 6
The Federal Circuit holds that subsection (b) forbids an im-
porter from protesting to the Court of International Trade any act or
decision of Customs which implements any decision or determina-
tion reviewable within the scope of section 751 administrative review
if a section 751 review was not conducted.' 0 7 Even if section 1514(a)
lists a matter as protestable directly to Customs, 0 8 if it is also deter-
minable in a section 751 review, such review must be conducted
before the matter can be heard in the Court of International Trade.
The court's application of the second aspect of its holding un-
derscores section 751's importance. The court rules that of the
seven parts of Nichimen's complaint, only the two express claims of
violations by Customs and the claim involving the settlement agree-
ment signed by the Attorney General, Commerce, and the Treasury
Department are beyond the scope of section 751 review.i09 It even
found Nichimen's claim that it was not the true importer of the tele-
vision receivers within the scope of section 751,11 though this mat-
ter is not expressly listed in section 751.'11
After Nichimen, section 751 reviews are of paramount impor-
tance. Not only is a request a prerequisite for judicial review, but
both the Federal Circuit and, in the lower court opinion, the Court of
104 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (1988).
105 19 U.S.C. § 1514(b) (1988).
106 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(l)(B), (a)(2)(B)(iii) (1988).
107 Nichimen America, Inc. v. United States, 938 F.2d 1286, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
108 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(1)-(7) (1988).
109 See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
110 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
I See 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1988).
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International Trade demonstrate a reluctance to find various matters
not within the scope of section 751 review.
Antidumping proceedings are very fact-oriented,"12 and thus
not easily overturned on appeal. 1 3 To the extent they are fact-ori-
ented, it appears that Commerce, in the forum of section 751 review,
now is the chief factfinder and arbiter of antidumping disputes. The
Federal Circuit has become increasingly non-deferential on the sub-
ject of interpretation of antidumping laws, but this trend does not
extend to fact-oriented disputes. 14
V. Conclusion
Both aspects of the Federal Circuit's holding are correct applica-
tions of the law. The statutory language and legislative history115
support the court's interpretation of the Transitional Rules. Fur-
thermore, five years passed between the time the underlying deter-
minations became judicially reviewable and the time Commerce
notified Nichimen of the additional 3.37% ad valorem duties on the
televisions.1 6 In light of this time lapse, and the $72,000 additional
assessment cost to Nichimen, 117 it appears that Nichimen did, in fact,
contest the additional duties, and not the underlying determinations.
Legislative history and good policy support the second aspect of
the court's holding, which respects statutory construction of section
751 reviews and Title 19, section 1514. In enacting the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, Congress expressed a preference for yearly
review, upon request, of antidumping determinations then in effect.
Such an all-encompassing review process, involving the entire an-
tidumping order and all parties affected can proceed far more expe-
ditiously than a haphazard series of protests of individual
112 Barshefsky & Cunningham, supra note 1, at 362.
113 On appeal, the Court of International Trade may overturn a section 751 review
decision concerning an antidumping determination where it is "unsupported by substan-
tial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a (b)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B)(iii) (1988). One commentator cautions that judicial review of
a section 751 ruling might often be "a fruitless exercise." Barshefsky & Cunningham,
supra note 1, at 362.
114 James R. Cannon, Should the Federal Circuit Take a "Hard Look" at International Trade
Cases in the 1990's?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1093 (1990) (arguing for closer scrutiny of agency
interpretations of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws).
115 See H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 189 (1979); S. REP. No. 249, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 255 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 641.
116 The underlying determinations never became judicially reviewable while the old
law was in effect since the entries were not liquidated until 1986. See supra note 74 and
accompanying text. However, under the Transitional Rules, they became reviewable on
the effective date of the Trade Agreements Act-January 1, 1980. Trade Agreements Act
of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1002(b)(3), 93 Stat. 144, 307 (Transitional Rules). See supra
note 48 and accompanying text. The Department of Commerce notified Nichimen of the
additional antidumping duties on August 30, 1985. Nichimen America, Inc. v. United
States, 938 F.2d 1286, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
117 The actual amount was $72,919.83. Nichimen America, Inc. v. United States, No.
88-128, 87-01-00047, 1988 WL 98472, at *2 (Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 22, 1988).
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assessments.' 18 Administrative review is also possible without the
complicated procedures regarding joinder and third party interven-
tion that would apply in the federal Court of International Trade.' 1 9
A unified process like section 751 review before a single body-
the Department of Commerce-affords consistency and makes possi-
ble a coherent policy on antidumping regulation. Court of Interna-
tional Trade decisions are rendered by either one judge or a panel of
three judges. 120 There are a total of nine judges on the court, no
more than five of which may be appointed from the same political
party.' 2 ' In the highly politicized area of enforcing laws against un-
fair foreign trade practices, there is great potential for disparity of
results when fact-oriented rulings are made in the Court of Interna-
tional Trade. Placing review of antidumping proceedings before
Commerce, a single administrative agency, contributes to a unified,
coherent antidumping policy for the United States.
MICHAEL P. HUECKER
118 See S. REP. No. 244, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 80-81 (1979), reprinted in 1979
U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 465-67.
119 Id.
120 Ruth F. Sturm, Customs: Past, Present, and Future, FED. B. NEWS &J., Mar.-Apr. 1990,
at 151-52.
121 Id. at 151.
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